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Counsel for Defendant/Counter-Claimant RIVER RANCH FRESH FOODS, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

NATURAL SELECTION FOODS, LLC,) dba EARTHBOUND FARMS, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, VS. RIVER RANCH FRESH FOODS, LLC, Hearing Date: Defendant/Counter-Claimant. Time: Place:

Case No. 5:07-cv-02548-JW [HON. JAMES WARE]

OPPOSITION OF RIVER RANCH FRESH FOODS TO MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS AND TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Sept. 11, 2007 10:00 a.m. Courtroom 8, 4th Floor, San Jose

Defendant and Counter-Claimant RIVER RANCH FRESH FOODS, LLC ("River Ranch") submits the following Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant NATURAL SELECTION FOODS' ("Natural Selection") Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims and to Strike Affirmative Defenses:

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1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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3	FEDERAL CASES:
4	Ammerman vs. Sween, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995) 2
5	Channel vs. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996)
6 7	Jones vs. Ford Motor Credit Company, 358 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004)
8	United Mine Workers vs. Gibbs,383 U.S. 715 (1966) 2
9	
10	FEDERAL STATUTES:
11	28 U.S.C. § 1367
12	28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
13	28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) 4, 6
14	
15	STATE CASES:
16	Aas vs. Superior Court 24 Cal.4th 627 (2000) 8
17	Chameleon Engineering Corp. vs. Air Dynamics, Inc., 101
18	Cal. App.3d 418 (1980)
19	Erlich vs. Menezes, 21 Cal.4th 543 (1999) 8
20	North American Chemical Co., vs. Superior Court 59 Cal. App.4th 764 (1997) 6, 7
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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The Nature of River Ranch's Counterclaims Falls Within the I. Supplemental Jurisdiction of the Court

Congress' enactment of 28 <u>U.S.C.</u> § 1367 explicitly extending the federal courts' jurisdiction to "all other claims" in a civil action "so related to claims in the action within [the district court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution" is consistent with the general principal that "two court actions should not be encouraged where one will do."

The court's authority to permit supplemental claims, even loosely related claims, is broad. In Ammerman vs. Sween, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995) the court held that § 1367 "confers supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of Article III of the Constitution..." (at page 424.) In keeping with the broad limits of supplemental jurisdiction courts have permitted expansive application. Illustrative is Channel vs. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996), in which the court interpreted the expanded jurisdictional scope of § 1367 to mean that "[a] loose factual connection between the claims" can be sufficient. (at page 385). In Jones vs. Ford Motor Credit Company, 358 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004), the court opined that the language of § 1367 appears to be broader than the test of "a common nucleus of operative facts" enunciated by the Court in United Mine Workers vs. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), decided prior to the enactment of § 1367.

River Ranch's claims fall within the broad range of the

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court's authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. River Ranch's allegations in support of its counterclaims show an ongoing contractual relationship between Natural Selection or its predecessor in interest and River Ranch covering a period of more than 6 years and involving the growing, processing, purchasing and sale of produce, all of which was supported by various marketing agreements and other related documents. Many of these agreements and related documents refer to federal statutes and regulations, i.e., reference to regulations developed by the FDA contained in the River Ranch Fresh Foods, LLC - Supplier Checklist attached as Exhibit B to River Ranch's counterclaim.

In an effort to narrowly characterize its claims, Natural Selection's argument is essentially linear in nature: "It wasn't until AFTER we sold you the good produce that we distributed the adulterated produce, therefore, there is no connection between the two claims sufficient for supplemental jurisdiction to exist."

However, Natural Selection's own Complaint references the problems involving the adulterated produce it was marketing. paragraphs 9 through 14 of its Complaint, Natural Selection alleges that produce had to be recalled, and alleges that Natural Selection gave "credit" to River Ranch which it alleges was more than sufficient. Accordingly, Natural Selection's argument that the subject of the adulterated produce is completely separate from its own claim is specious.

In fact, it can reasonably be argued that River Ranch's counterclaims are "compulsory." In Jones vs. Ford Motor Credit Company, 358 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004), the court opined that both

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the ECOA claim and the debt collection claims originated from the plaintiffs' decision to purchase Ford cars. In the same vein, Natural Selection's claim to recover for produce sold and River Ranch's counterclaims for damages arise out of River Ranch's decision to purchase product from Natural Selection and Natural Selection's decision to sell produce to River Ranch. The court here has authority under 28 <u>U.S.C.</u> § 1367 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction is proper based on the relationship of the parties, common agreements, and the produce purchase and sale connection between the claims.

Natural Selection's Argument that River Ranch's II. Counterclaims Should be Dismissed Because They "Substantially Predominate" Over Natural Selection's PACA Claim Should Be Rejected.

As a "fall-back" Natural Selection argues that even if supplemental jurisdiction exists under § 1367(a), the court should exercise its discretion under subsection (b) and decline to allow the supplemental claims because River Ranch's counterclaims "substantially predominate" over Natural Selection's original claim.

In an attempt to support this position, Natural Selection argues that River Ranch's counterclaims would "introduce a vast spectrum of new and unrelated issues..." (Natural Selection Motion page 7, line 10) which would include the following:

(i) A determination of the cause of the [E. Coli] outbreak.

This will not be an "issue" and, if it were, it has already

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been determined by the California Department of Health Services and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, as set forth in its "final" report of 21 March 2007 entitled Investigation of Escherichia coli) 0157-H7 Outbreak Associated with Dole-Prepackaged Spinach.

(ii) An evaluation of Natural Selection's overall food safety practices in comparison to overall industry practice.

Again, this is certainly not a legitimate issue as far as River Ranch's First Counterclaim is concerned, and in view of the adulterated produce which Natural Selection introduced into the stream of commerce, may well be a nonexistent major issue with respect to the Second and Third Counterclaims.

(iii) A calculation of the multiple categories of consequential damages alleged by River Ranch.

River Ranch is confident that the Court will be able to handle whatever damage issues and/or calculations may be necessary.

Natural Selection's argument that permitting the counterclaims would frustrate the purposes of PACA Trust legislation is baseless and the cases cited in support thereof are clearly inapplicable. Natural Selection's footnote on page 8 of its motion quoting the 1984 amendments to the PACA Trust statute is misleading. The 1984 amendment had to do with the creation of a statutory trust in order to give unpaid suppliers what is essentially a "super-priority" over secured lenders - the instant litigation has no relation whatsoever to the purposes of the 1984 amendment. Natural Selection's claim is at most a simple collection matter, for which they could as easily have

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For the foregoing reasons, the court should exercise its discretion under subsection (b) to allow River Ranch's counterclaims to be asserted in this action.

III. <u>Natural Selection's Argument That the Negligence</u>

<u>Counterclaims Should Be Dismissed Because they Are Really</u>

Contract Claims is Baseless.

Natural Selection argues that conduct which amounts to a breach of contract cannot support a claim for damages based on negligence. This is simply wrong. North American Chemical Co., vs. Superior Court 59 Cal. App.4th 764 (1997) is authority for the proposition that negligent performance of a contractual obligation gives rise to an action in tort. In that case, North American Chemical entered into a contract with Trans Harbor which required Trans Harbor to package and ship certain chemicals for delivery abroad. In connection with the performance of its packaging duties, Trans Harbor utilized a silo that had previously been used for to store a different chemical which resulted in contamination. North American sued Trans Harbor for negligence. Rejecting Trans Harbor's argument that North American could only sue for breach of contract, the court stated:

Harbor Pac's contract with North American imposed a legal duty on Harbor Pac to perform that contract with due care. Its alleged failure to do so was a breach of that legal duty giving North American a remedy in tort as well as contract.

At pages 785,786

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With respect to River Ranch's Third Counterclaim (Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage), Chameleon Engineering Corp. vs. Air Dynamics, Inc., 101 Cal. App.3d 418 (1980), clearly establishes the validity of such a theory of recovery. In that case a subcontractor negligently failed to supply the general contractor with the materials necessary to timely meet the contract deadline, thereby causing the general contractor to suffer damages. The court permitted a claim against the negligent subcontractor for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. River Ranch's claims that Natural Selection' negligence which resulted in adulterated product being re-sold by River Ranch and subsequent damage to River Ranch are analogous to the foregoing cases.

The "Economic Loss" Rule is Inapplicable. IV.

North American Chemical Co., vs. Superior Court 59 Cal. App. 4th 764 (1997) is authority for the proposition that the "Economic Loss" Rule does not apply in cases involving the negligent performance of services (as opposed to the sale of good) which results in foreseeable economic loss.

The relationship between River Ranch and Natural Selection was not simply one of buyer and seller. Central to River Ranch's counterclaims are the processing procedures and standards set forth in the River Ranch Fresh Foods, LLC - Supplier Checklist, [Exhibit B to counterclaim], which Natural Selection was required to

follow in connection with its preparation and packaging of produce for delivery to River Ranch.

Erlich vs. Menezes, 21 Cal.4th 543 (1999), cited by Natural Selection, is simply inapplicable. In that case the issue before the court was whether emotional distress damages are recoverable for the negligent breach of a contract to construct a house. Likewise, the case of Aas vs. Superior Court 24 Cal.4th 627 (2000) is a construction defect case.

V. River Ranch Has Sufficiently Alleged "Independently
Wrongful" Conduct in Connection With Its Counterclaim
For Negligent Interference With Prospective Economic
Advantage.

As set forth in paragraph 78 of its Counterclaim,

Natural Selection negligently failed to take reasonable and
necessary steps in the processing of its produce to ensure
it was not contaminated.

VI. The Alleged "Inconsistency" Between River Ranch's

Contract Claim and Attached Documents Is Nonexistent.

Natural Selection points out that the parties named in the "Master Crop Agreement" attached to River Ranch's counterclaim are River Ranch and Pride of San Juan and that Natural Selection's name does not appear. Natural Selection apparently failed to read paragraph 55 of the counterclaim wherein it is alleged:

It is anticipated that the details of exactly how and when Natural Selection succeeded to this agreement will be developed during discovery.

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VI. <u>Natural Selection's Motion to Strike the Affirmative</u> Defenses Should Be Rejected Out of Hand.

Natural Selection's argument that the affirmative defenses are not proper affirmative defenses is based upon the erroneous assumption that any improper or wrongful conduct on the part of Natural Selection that might have occurred prior to the time it sold the produce for which it is suing, could never, as a matter of law, reduce or offset the amount for which Natural Selection is suing.

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VII. <u>Summary</u>

As stated in <u>Jones vs. Ford Motor Credit Company</u>, 358 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004):

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... [W]here at least one of the subsection 1367(c) factors is applicable, a district court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless it also determines that doing do would not promote the values articulated in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at

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726: economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Emphasis supplied

The particular facts of this case clearly establish the existence of the court's supplemental jurisdiction, and justify the court exercising its discretion to permit the counterclaims to go forward and to deny Natural Selection's request that River Ranch's affirmative defenses be stricken.

Respectfully submitted, 11

August 21, 2007

CHOATE & CHOATE

/s/ Joseph Choate, Jr. Joseph Choate, Jr. Counsel for Defendant/ Counter-Claimant, River Ranch Fresh Foods, LLC.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2596 Mission Street, Suite 300, San Marino, CA 91108. On the date set forth below I served the document(s) named below on the parties in this action as follows:

DOCUMENT(S) SERVED:

OPPOSITION OF RIVER RANCH FRESH FOODS TO MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS AND TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

SERVED UPON:

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(BY MAIL) I caused each such envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, to be placed in the United States mail at San Marino, California. I am readily familiar with the practice of Choate & Choate for collection and processing correspondence for mailing, said practice being that in the ordinary course of business, mail is deposited in the United States Postal Service the same day as it is placed for collection.

(FEDERAL CM/ECF) I have reviewed the latest CM/ECF Notice of Electronic Filing in this matter and determined that the court's electronic notice system will provide notice via e-mail to the above parties.